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Abstract 
Thierry Baudet s remarkable success at the 2019 Dutch provincial elections was difficult to comprehend 
given the hitherto increasing popularity of the long-term dominant figure in Dutch far-right politics, 
Geert Wilders. Although both politicians preside over strikingly similar policy agendas, Wilders  
supporters appeared to abandon him in favour of Baudet. This study attempted to investigate why 
Dutch far-right voters may have shifted their allegiance from Wilders s Partij Voor de Vrijheid to 
Baudet s Forum voor Democratie through a Discourse Historical Analysis of Baudet s provincial 
elections victory speech and a corpus of Wilders  discursive texts. Prior to commencing this analysis, the 
study s methodological approach for addressing such a complex topic was justified by means of 
demonstrating the close interrelationship between context, discourse and political strategy. The 
analysis discovered that Baudet distinguishes himself by constructing a less repressive guise for his 
party through careful characterisation of the Dutch identity rather than demonising the cultural enemy 
like Wilders and other leaders of the new right.  
Key words: Populist discourse, Dutch identity, Dutch politics, European nationalism, Refugee 
discourse, Islamophobia 
Introduction 
The results of the most recent Dutch provincial elections, held on 20 March 2019, were 
remarkable for one reason in particular: A new right-wing populist party, Forum voor 
Democratie (FvD), won the most votes. Due to the nature of the Dutch indirect electoral 
system in which elected provincial councillors determine the composition of the national 
senate two months after the elections, the FvD were then able to obtain the equal most 
seats in the 75-seat senate (12). The centre-right Rutte government has now lost its 
majority in the upper house, which further restricts its already limited legislative 
capacity that up until these elections relied upon a four-party coalition to pass laws. 
Although these outcomes are unlikely to result in the FvD forming government at the 
next national elections in 2021, as the national electorate is highly fractionalised and 
major parties have repeatedly stated their aversion to forming a coalition with right-
wing populist parties, the FvD will nevertheless have considerable influence over policy 
decisions throughout the remainder of this political term. Moreover, they will give the 
party and its young, charismatic leader, Thierry Baudet, an ideal platform for shaping 
future policy preferences in the Netherlands and, to a certain extent, at the European 
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level, where the party will look to enlarging its current share of just under 11% of Dutch 
votes in the European Parliament.  
Right- i g li m i   e   he Ne he la d . Gee  Wilde  Pa ij V  de 
Vrijheid (PVV) has been relatively successful at both national elections and European 
a liame  elec i  i ce he a  i ce i  i  2006 a d Wilde  file i  a g abl  
bigger than that of any other Dutch politician of his era; both at home and abroad. Prior 
to Wilders, Pim Fortuyn  who was assassinated in the lead up to the 2002 Dutch 
a i al elec i  b  a l cal a imal igh  cam aig e  i  de   defe d D ch 
M lim  f m e ec i   had also given salience to policies of the extreme right 
(Evans-P i cha d a d Cleme , 2003). H e e , ei he  Wilde  PVV  F  
Lijst Pim Fortuyn has enjoyed as much success at a national senate election as the FvD 
achie ed ea lie  hi  ea . F  cce   1 a d 0 ea  a  he 2003 a d 2007 
elections respectively, while the PVV achieved its best result in 2011, winning 12.74% of 
the overall vote and 11 seats. Despite only forming at the end of 2016 and winning 1.78% 
f e  a d 2 ea  a  he 2017 a i al ge e al elec i , Ba de  la i  ha  
surged in a short period of time, winning the greatest number votes at the senate 
elec i  f 2019 a  15.87%. I e e i gl , Wilde  blic a eal a ea ed  be  he 
rise until the recent elections, having ranked fourth at the senate elections in both 2011 
and 2015 before winning 13.1% of the overall vote to rank second at the most recent 
lower house elections in 2017. However, this trajectory was reversed at the 2019 
i cial elec i  he e he a  lled i  l  6.46% f he a i  e   ank 
seventh. So while it arguably comes as little surprise that there was considerable public 
support for right-wing populism at the recent Dutch provincial elections, the question is 
why was that support redirected from an established right-wing populist party that 
appeared to be expanding its influence to a new one that has very similar policies and 
virtually no presence in the house of representatives?  
Two explanations of this outcome tend to be offered by commentators. The first is that 
Baudet is simply more eloquent and presentable than Wilders, which in turn convinces 
those with far right-wing preferences that he is more capable of securing their interests. 
The ec d a g e  ha  Ba de  lic  age da, hile imila   Wilde , di e ge  i  
subtle ways to give it a less repressive guise without compromising key right-wing 
interests. In each case, the political discourse of both leaders is of fundamental 
im a ce; el e ce a d e e a i  efe  di ec l   e  blic add e e  hile 
policy agendas are predominantly justified through discursive means.  
Accordingly, the objective of this paper is to firstly demonstrate the significance of 
discourse in identity politics and to secondly develop a clearer understanding of the 
discursive means through which Baudet attempts to influence policy preferences and 
distinguish himself from Wilders. In order to achieve this, a comprehensive explanation 
f he d  me h d l gical f ame k ill be ided bef e c d c i g a Di c e 
Historical Analysis (DHA) f Ba de  Ma ch 21 ic  eech. The ea  hi  
particular text has been selected for the analysis as opposed to other speeches that have 
been delivered by Baudet over the course of his short political career is because it 
captures his vision for Dutch civilisation in the midst of what many commentators label 
a ef gee c i i   ide i  c i i .  C e e l , he a al i  ill f c  e cl i el   
areas of the selected text that concern national identity, Dutch history, immigration and 
refugee se leme . Th gh  he DHA, Ba de  e  ill be c m a ed i h a elec ed 
c  f Wilde  li ical eeche . While i  ma  a ea  a li le a bi a   elec  





discursive texts in the analysis, none of his victory speeches have been as elaborate as 
Ba de   ha e he  a em ed  f ame he ef gee i a i , de i e he la e  bei g 
a  i eg al a  f Wilde  li ical age da. Therefore, it is believed that an analysis of 
a corpus of his addresses will enable a more accurate discursive comparison for the 
purposes of this study. The next sections will explain in further detail the political 
c e  f Ba de  add e , di c i g he d amic  f he E ea  ef gee ituation 
and the recent history of immigration and refugee settlement in the Netherlands. 
Following this, the literature on populism and critical discourse analysis will be reviewed 
a d he  he DHA f Ba de  ic  eech ill be c d c ed. The a e  ill conclude 
with an evaluation of the discursive means through which Baudet attempts to 
distinguish himself from Wilders along with a recommendation for future research on 
this topic.  
European Refugee Situation  
Although Western Europe has a long history with migrants and refugees, the arrival of 
over 1 million people from the Middle East and elsewhere in 2015 represented a 
challenge that the European Union and its member states were unprepared for 
(European Parliament, 2017). The majority of these migrants were escaping conflict in 
S ia  he  l ca i  i  he egi  a d h , ld be ega ded a  a l m eeke ,  
under the definitions provided in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (the convention) 
(Millbank, 2000). Nearly all of these asylum seekers were of Muslim faith and arrived 
in Europe after having made the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean on 
overcrowded boats departing from Northern Africa or Turkey. This became particularly 
problematic because most of these boats arrived in Greece: an EU member state that has 
been plagued by economic problems in recent times and hence lacking the resources to 
handle the crisis.  
While policymakers may have felt that measures were already in place to manage this 
task, including the logistical support of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
and the open borders policy known as the Schengen Agreement, the policy response and 
debates that ensued among EU member states were anything but convergent. National 
responses varied across a range of policy agendas from those advocating open borders, 
such as Germany, to those opposing the arrivals by erecting fences along border hotspots 
and by waging powerful political campaigns, such as Hungary. The Schengen Agreement 
gives European citizens de jure access to the labour market, education system and 
welfare state of each signatory state. However, it does not oblige these states to accept 
any number of Muslim asylum seekers (MAS), who are, in effect, attempting to obtain 
the equivalent citizenship rights of a European citizen through refugee status. 
Furthermore, while International law theoretically compels signatories of the 
convention to accommodate asylum seekers and uphold minimum treatment standards, 
it is lexically ambiguous in places and lacks even the most basic enforcement instrument 
to ensure compliance and so refugee policy remains very much a national competency 
(Millbank, 2000).  
Thi  legi la i e c e  i  c mbi a i  i h E e  ge g a hic c m i i  (m l i le 
countries within relatively close proximity to each other) has rendered the refugee 
situation even more problematic because MAS have been traversing the continent to 
find the most comfortable living environment, whether that be driven by reasons of 
family reunification, employment or welfare support. The failure of the EU and its 
member states to initiate any form of coordinated effort to accommodate the newly 
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arrived MAS has resulted in many commentators (including the European Parliament) 
efe i g  he i a i  a  he E ea  ef gee c i i .  Thi  e m ha  f e  bee  
accompanied by inflammatory language that politicians and the media deploy to arouse 
fear of MAS among voters, which in turn, can generate support for anti-refugee 
sentiments.  
Immigration and Refugee Settlement in the Netherlands 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Netherlands became more culturally 
diverse than it had ever previously been due to the arrival of large numbers of guest 
workers from Turkey, Morocco, Italy and Spain along with the post-colonial 
immigration of Indonesians and Surinamese people (Engbersen et al, 2003). However, 
most of these migrants were received in order to satisfy local interests such as the need 
 b  he lab  l  i  he a i  a idl  e a di g i d ie  f he 1950  a d 
60s. The arrival of Indonesians after decolonisation in 1945 was complicated by the 
D ch g e me  ie  em ha  ga e efe e ce  h e i h E ea   a d 
a g abl  he alded he c  fea  f c l al i c m a ibili  ha  ld bec me a 
major theme at all significant immigration debates to the present day. While the 
Netherlands took in thousands of refugees from Hungary, the Baltic states, Angola, 
Vietnam and Yugoslavia over the latter half of the twentieth century, the country was 
very much divided as to whether such a commitment should be made, given the alleged 
cultural problems associated with refugee settlement (Vogel, 2000).  
Despite being widely regarded as a nation that espouses tolerance for minority groups, 
this polarisation with respect to attitudes towards refugees appears to have persisted in 
the present context to some extent. Recent large-scale value surveys have demonstrated 
that the majority of Dutch people believe their country should take in more refugees 
(Connor, 2018; Klaver, 2016), but these results tend to have little impact on policy 
outcomes, as reflected in the consistent success of far right-wing political parties in the 
country since the start of this decade. This apparent inconsistency is possibly due to the 
fact that far-right wing voters in the Netherlands are more interested in politics than the 
average Dutch person and that voting is not compulsory in the Netherlands, so those 
who are less passionate about political matters can simply avoid the polling booths (Van 
Steenbergen, 2016). Nevertheless, as Besselink (2008) points out, since the turn of the 
century several legislative developments have also made it more difficult for foreign 
cultures to integrate into Dutch society. Not only have sanctions for inadequate 
integration been tightened in the form of the Act on Civic Integration Abroad 2006 and 
the Civic Integration Act 2007, but also the conditions that constitute adequate 
integration have become a lot more difficult to attain; with the Aliens Act 2000 requiring 
prospective citizens to pass an oral language exam before they arrive in the Netherlands.  
All this considered, the success of the PVV and FvD in recent times is somewhat 
i i g gi e  D ch cie  g e i e e a i  a d i  c ide able e erience 
with foreign cultures and refugee settlement. In the latter case it should be noted that 
the intake of Yugoslavian refugees in 1994 registered very similar numbers to those 
recorded in 2015, which was the year in which the Netherlands received the most asylum 
applications in the context of the current refugee situation (VluchtelingenWerk 
Nederland, 2019). However, an important distinction between these two cases is that 
the current situation has occurred after a period of sustained tension between the 
Western World and Islam in which a series of brutal terrorist attacks have taken place 





surrounding refugee policies that almost exclusively concern asylum seekers of Muslim 
faith.  
Populism  
I  c em a  E e he e m li m  i  f e  ed  l el  ca eg i e a ie  
that challenge the political status quo or offer new and alternative policies to 
mainstream parties. However, several scholars have taken issue with generalisation and 
sought to provide a more precise definition to facilitate future comparative research. 
Interpretations have varied from a political strategy that centres itself on the persuasive 
powers of a charismatic leader (Weyland, 2001) to one that emphasises a strong 
c ec i  i h he e le  (Tagga , 2000)  h e ha  a g e he e m de e  a  
adhe e ce  a hi -centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated 
i   h m ge  a d a ag i ic g , he e e le  e  he c  eli e  
(Mudde, 2004, 543; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Stanley, 2008). Van Leeuwen 
(2014) postulates that populism distinguishes itself from mainstream politics through 
the regular use of categorical statements and absolutes.  
Despite this inconsistency, two recent publications have identified three features that 
regularly appear in the literature and touch aspects of most interpretations. Kaltwasser 
et al (2017) noted that studies in multiple continents since the late 19th century all 
di i g i hed li m f m he  li ical a egie  f  i  di ec  a eal  he e le  
( f e  a i g hem a  i he e l  i  a d d if l  di ad a aged), i  fie ce 
opposition to the establishment and its attempt at cultivating nationalistic sentiments. 
Comparably, Moffit (2016, p45), who focussed on more recent literature and political 
di c e, a g ed ha  li m i  a li ical le ha  fea e  a  a eal  he 
e le  e  he eli e , bad ma e  a d he e f mance of crisis, breakdown or 
h ea .  Wi hi  hei  e ec i e a al e  f he af eme i ed fea e , b h f he e 
blica i  em ha i e he ig ifica ce f he li  leade  e e a i , hich a  
mentioned in the introduction, is largely constructed through discursive means. This 
departure point is based on the substantial critical discourse analysis (CDA) literature 
ha   he he  ha  di c e i  b h ciall  c i ed a d ciall  
c i i e , mea i g ha  i  ha e  cial m ements and cultural practices while also 
being shaped by them at the same time (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89). This literature 
will be reviewed in the upcoming section of the paper.  
Discourse Historical Analysis 
The field known as CDA (also referred to as Critical Discourse Studies) is best described 
as a heterogeneous school of methodological approaches to discourse analysis that was 
established in the early 1990s by a group of sociolinguists. Three of the scholars 
responsible for its establishment, namely Ruth Wodak, Teun Van Dijk and Norman 
Fairclough, have all constructed different CDA frameworks over the past few decades, 
but they all share a common theoretical nexus around the principle of interdisciplinarity 
along with a belief in the close relationship between discourse and identity construction. 
Va  Dijk  (1998) ci -c g i i e e ec i e i  de i ed b  he ide l gical a e  
concept that emphasises the tendency of social discursive practices to create in-
group/out-group binaries whereby members of the former will extol their own identities 
a d dem i e h e bel gi g  he la e  g . Fai cl gh  (2003) ci -cultural 
approach focuses on the semiotic effects of institutions and how signifiers from various 
institutions conceptualise their ide i ie  i  diffe e  a . A d fi all , W dak  (2001) 
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DHA stresses the importance of the relationship between identity discourse and the 
broader socio-cultural and historical context and is particularly interested in the way 
such discourses are reproduced over time. Despite the nuanced variations, each of these 
methodological approaches incorporates an assessment of various external influences 
and social structures into the analysis. Moreover, CDA proponents such as the 
aforementioned scholars invariably underline the link between discourse, power and 
ideology.  
Di c i e ac ice  ma  ha e maj  ide l gical effec   that is, they can help 
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social 
classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through 
he a  i  hich he  e e e  hi g  a d i i  e le  (Fai cl gh a d 
Wodak, 1997: 258).  
This belief undoubtedly explains why CDA scholars seek to uncover the manipulative 
discursive strategies of far right-wing politicians.  
W dak  DHA i  he me h d l gical f ame k ha  ill be a lied  hi  i e iga i  
because it appears to be the most comprehensive. Its multi-level contextual analysis is 
f a ic la  im a ce  he elec ed e . The ch la  ecent DHA works include an 
a icle  Da id Came  Bl mbe g eech  he E ea  U i  (2018), a 
comparative assessment of the legitimisation of immigration control in European 
c ie  (2017) a d a  a al i  f he media  a al f he B i i h identity in the 
aftermath of a divisive speech from Ed Milliband (2016). Each of these studies were able 
to demonstrate a connection between multiple contextual dimensions, discourse 
formation and identity politics. By using the DHA framework in this paper, it is believed 
that the same discoveries will be made. Typically, the DHA integrates four different 
levels of contextual analysis in a recursive fashion: 
1. the immediate language; 
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, 
genres, and discourses; 
3. the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of the specific 
c e  f i a i ; 
4. the broader socio-political and historical context which the discursive practices 
under examination are embedded in and related to. (Reisgl and Wodak, 2001, 
p41) 
Close engagement with this multi-level contextual analysis will facilitate the process of 
identifying the main genres of the text. The messages contained within the identified 
genres, and their pathos, will then be further deconstructed through frequent referral to 
three other frameworks that are regularly applied in DHA and CDA literature.  
The first of these was developed by Wodak and colleagues in 1999 and attempts to 
categorise the nature of the discursive identity strategy adopted by a given 
communicator (Wodak et al, 1999). This original study deduced from its findings that 
far right-wing leaders typically deploy one of four discursive macro-strategies when 
framing the national identity: 
x constructive strategies (aiming at constructing national identities) 
x preservative or justificatory strategies (aiming at conserving or reproducing 





x transformative strategies (aiming at changing existing national identity 
narratives) 
x destructive strategies (aiming at dismantling existing national identity 
narratives) 
The importance of this framework lies in its function in sharpening our understanding 
f he c mm ica  i i  a d c c i  f he i -group/out-group demarcation. 
Follo i g Va  Dijk  (1998: 236) ide l gical a e  c ce  
Xe h bic g   a ie  ma  e gage i  aci  ac i , b  all  de  ha  
such actions are racist, and hence outside of the moral order. Instead, they will 
claim ha  i  i  a al   make a distinction or even to establish a hierarchy 
between Us and Them, to accord priority to US, or to give preferential access to 
mb lic  ma e ial e ce  beca e f bl d, il  i a e cha ac e i ic .  
In other words, national identity narratives serve the purpose of demarcating in-groups 
from out-groups and subtly legitimating negative attitudes toward out-groups.  
Because the above-discussed identity construction categories are constructed through 
discourse, it is also necessary to conduct a systematic linguistic analysis of any CDA text 
ha  i  bjec ed  he f me  f ame k. Rei igl a d W dak  2001 d   he 
Rhetorics of Racism and Anti-Semitism created a scaffold to facilitate such an analysis, 
distinguishing five linguistic strategies that right-wing leaders deploy within their 
exclusionist frames. These are described in table 1.  
Table 1: Exclusionary linguistic strategies 
Discursive strategy Description Examples 
Referential/Nomination 
strategies 
How persons are 
named or referred to 
linguistically 
Metonymy  Ya k  ma  li g i icall  
e e e  Ame ica  
Synecdoche  Allah  ma  li g i icall  
e e e  I lam  
Metaphor  Pa a i e  ma  li g i icall  
e e e  A l m eeke  
Strategies of 
predication 
The traits, values or 
features that are 
attributed to certain 
groups 
A speaker might attribute business 
acumen to Jewish people or they might 
stereotype Americans as people of white 
ethnicity.  
Ge e al D gla  MacA h  (Whi e 
e h ici ) i  a e Ame ica  he .  
Strategies of 
argumentation 
The means by which 
the above positive or 
negative attributions 
are justified.  
We ha e a igh   e cl de M lim  f m 
our society because they contravene 
m l i le ge de  igh  la .   
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Taken from Reisigl & Wodak, 2001. 
As can be inferred from the previously explained quote from Van Dijk (1998) and the 
description of argumentation strategies in Table 1, legitimation also plays a significant 
role in national identity discourse. Its purpose is to frame the exclusionist aspect 
contained within the discourse as ethically justifiable, consequently stripping it of its 
racist and/or social discriminatory undertone. This enables ethnic discrimination to 
e e  c mm  di c e a d e d ce i elf e  ime. Al h gh Va  Lee e  (1996) 
four-category legitimisation model has featured more regularly in DHA literature, I will 
e Re e  (2011) f ame k i  hi  d  beca e I c ide  i  ligh l  m e 
informative. Whereas Van Leeuwen distinguished between authorisation (legitimisation 
through authority or institutions), rationalisation (legitimisation through utility), moral 
evaluation (legitimisation through ethical foundations) and mythopoesis (legitimisation 
h gh e ca i e elli g), Re e  effec i el  e e ed Va  Lee e  fi  hree 
categories and replaced mythopoesis with two categories that broaden the spectrum of 
legitimation strategies without compromising the storytelling approach. Reyes 
distinguishes between the following five legitimisation strategies: 
x Legitimisation through emotions 
x Legitimisation through a hypothetical future 
x Legitimisation through rationality  
x Voices of expertise 
x Altruism 
While he e i  c ide able e la  i h Va  Lee e  f ame k, Re e  fi   
strategies in particular allow for a more nuanced analysis, as the former encourages 
investigation of the myriad ways in which communicators elicit emotional responses 
beyond storytelling while the latter accounts for fear-mongering future hypotheticals 
that have tended to dominate RWNP discourse. All of the above three frameworks will 
be a lied  he DHA f Ba de  2019 i cial elec i  ic  eech i  he 
following section. As the address and local reactions are in Dutch, Dutch to English 









expressed? I.e. How 
involved is the 
speaker? 
Close involvement e.g., I a  ai ed b  a 
single mother and can truly appreciate the 
great sacrifices made by women in our 
cie .   
Detachment e.g., We e e e  k  
Swedish people to be this malicious and 
e d  k  he f ll de ail  f he 










Amplifying particles e.g., We c dem  
the utterly disgraceful acts committed 
e e da .  
Anonymisation by impersonalising 
constructions e.g., I  eem  fai l  clea  
that these people have little respect for our 





DHA  Ba det s Victory Speech 
In the immediate aftermath of the 2019 Dutch provincial elections of March 20, Thierry 
Baudet delivered what one of the largest Dutch national newspapers, De Volkskrant, 
de c ibed a  he m  e a di a  ic  eech i  D ch li ical hi  
(Tempelman, 2019). While the reason behind this summation from De Volkskrant 
a ea   be limi ed  he add e  m i  a d i  igi ali , hi  DHA ill 
demonstrate that most of its power lies in its subtlety. Throughout the analysis 
comparisons will be made with the discursive strategies commonly deployed by Geert 
Wilders in order to work towards the objective of acquiring a better understanding as to 
why the FvD appears to have replaced the PVV as the main populist party in the 
Netherlands, despite the latter having grown steadily in popularity in the years leading 
up to the recent elections while also sharing a very similar policy agenda with the FvD.  
Baudet opens his address with a referential strategy that heralds one of the major genres 
f he e : i ellec ali m. He e  Hegel  me a h  he l f Mi e a eadi g i  
i g  a  igh fall   c m a e he F D a d i  e   he R ma  g dde  f 
wisdom (Baudet, 2019). This is somewhat unconventional for a far right-wing populist 
politician, as most of his contemporaries market themselves as leaders who are in touch 
i h he e e le  f he c  a d c e e l  e la g age ha  d e   ha e 
c a i  f eli i m  he e bial i  e . Wilde , f  e am le, ha  bee  
de c ibed a  me e h  emb ace  he image f a e le  ee figh e  (Ma li a & 
Keyzer, 2019) and is much more likely to use profanities in his addresses than metaphors 
that the majority of interlocutors would have to research to be able to properly interpret. 
I  ligh  f hi  la e  i , Ba de  l me a h  d e   ha e a clea  a achme   
an established Dutch identity narrative that would allow it to resonate with the broader 
public. However, this section will later demonstrate how the message contained within 
he me a h  c me   e e e  a  i eg al a  f Ba de  c c i e di c i e 
strategy.  
Following this introduction, Baudet deploys an argumentation strategy that at first 
glance appears t  be imila   h e f e  f d i  Wilde  di c e, b  a  cl e  
inspection offers a more sophisticated  and arguably more convincing  frame for 
legitimising one of the far- igh  m  di i i e licie . “We stand here tonight. At the 
eleventh hour, literally. In the middle of the debris of what was once the greatest and 
most beautiful civilisation that the world has ever known.  
Wilders regularly evokes a sense of local as well as European and global crisis with 
e e i  ch a  Wha  a d m . Wha  a me  (Wilde , 2017) a d efe i g  
m de  ci ili a i  a  E abia  a d Nede abia  i  e e  hi  e ce i  f he 
large presence of Arabic people (Wilders, 2007). The argument presented by both 
leaders is that uncontrolled immigration, or more specifically, the influx of foreign 
cultures, is responsible for the destruction of Dutch society. However, while both 
emphatically express their displeasure with the outcome of socio-political developments 
in the Netherlands, which itself is a straightforward intensification strategy, the means 
through which they deliver their arguments (argumentation strategies) differ strikingly. 
Whe ea  Wilde  im l  a em   dem i e he e em   he ca e  f he cial 
crisis through unambiguous tirades against Muslim people, Baudet never specifies who 
is responsible for the demise of Dutch civilisation and instead allows the audience to 
ea il  i fe  h  i  i  b  clea l  ide if i g h  he hei   he g ea e  ci ili a i  a e. 
A key dimension of Van Dijk  U  a d Them  dich m  i  ca ed b  Be habib  
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(1996) i h  mma , O e i  a B ia  Se b  he deg ee  hich e i   a 
B ia  M lem  C a .  I  hi  ic  add e , Ba de  de l  a c c i e 
discursive macro-strategy to demarcate the Dutch in-group, which in turn encourages 
interlocutors to consider which out-g  eed  be e cl ded i  de   d i e a 
e ai a ce  f he g ea  ci ili a i . It is the efficacy of this construction strategy in 
combination with his use of several context-specific intensification strategies that 
position the audience to view Muslim people as the out-group that represents the 
greatest threat to Dutch society.  
Af e  ge e a i g a e e f c i i  a d lame i g he de c i  f he g ea e  
ci ili a i , Ba de  ell  hi  a die ce what constituted its eminence. “A civilisation 
that… has produced the most beautiful architecture, the most beautiful music and the 
most beautiful paintings.  
While these qualities appear to be detached from ethnicity, by deconstructing their 
image in a historical context one recognises the racial preferences he is attempting to 
trigger. Not only is he attempting to construct a national identity around high culture 
and intellect, but by evoking memories of the most famous Dutch artists from the 
c  hi  ch a  Remb a d  a d Va  G gh, he i  a l i g a edica i  a eg  
that encourages the public to think of its in-group as a club for those with traditional 
Dutch surnames, or more specifically, people of white ethnicity. This becomes more 
apparent in the next lines of his address where he states, “Our country is a part of that 
civilisation family. But just like the other countries from our boreal world, we are 
destroyed by the people that are supposed to protect us.  
A  Tem elma  (2019) i  , he e m b eal  ed  a ea  i  f me  fa -right 
French politician Jean-Ma ie Le Pe  eeche , la gel  beca e i  a  ie ed a  a chic 
b i e  f  he e m A a . The O f d E gli h dic i a  defi e  i  a  f he h 
 he  egi ,  hich al  ha  c a i  f A a i m, hile Klei a e (2019) 
a g e  i  ha  l g bee  ec g i ed a  he deafe i g d g hi le  hi e emaci .  
Ul ima el , Ba de  a i al ide i  f ame c i e  a c c i e di c i e 
macro-strategy as opposed to a preservative or transformative one given that there does 
not appear to be an established narrative of the Dutch identity. The Dutch collective 
de a di g ha  bee  de c ibed b  ci l gi  a  eak  a d i a ic la e , hich 
they argue are qualities that are generally interpreted as a positive reflection of the 
a i  le a ce a d fle ibili  (Ve eeg, 2012; Pel , 2005).  
The fac  ha  m  e le ld ha e  ea ch f  he mea i g f b eal,  ei f ce  
Ba de  ide i  f ame, a  i  c mbi e  e cl i i  a i ali m i h hi  jec i  f 
reason and intellect. He is attempting to steer away from the conventional far-right 
image of primitive nationalism that caters to the uneducated or the working class, and 
instead create an image for himself and his followers as informed nationalists who seek 
a future that prioritises artistic and intellectual excellence. This frame is maintained 
throughout the address through various discursive means. Firstly, he uses a voices of 
expertise strategy in which he presents figures that demonstrate the thoroughness of his 
elec i  cam aig   legi imi e he ce f hi  a  idea . Then he deploys another 
subtle predication strategy whereby he quotes an Aryan Dutch poet in describing his 
m i a i   e e  li ic . The  ld e e  ha e d   me, if i  did  
c i e  g  d .  N  l  d e  he e ic e e c ib te to the sense of social 
crisis by suggesting that Baudet would never have stood in the election if Dutch culture 





culturally enlightened. Thirdly, Baudet condemns the alleged disappearance of the 
Dutch language from local universities, interpreting the development as evidence that 
e le d  belie e i  he Ne he la d  a m e.  Thi  a  he i -group down to 
people with a high level of control over the Dutch language, which in turn, further 
aci e  h e h  e e  b  i  he Ne he la d . Al h gh Wilde  eld m 
identifies the Dutch identity, his image would undoubtedly fall in the conventional far-
right category as he prefers to refer to people such as fishermen from the culturally 
h m ge e  c mm i  f U k a  he e he e  f he Ne he la d  a d h e 
made  c  g ea  a d e  (Wilde , 2018). The e e   hich Ba de  
applies the national identity frame represents the most significant point of difference 
between his discourse and that of Wilders.  
While Baudet is determined to build an image for himself and his party that centres on 
intellect and high culture, he is careful to distinguish these characteristics from elitism. 
This distincti  i  a he  al gi e  li m  e de c   a cia e i ellec ali m 
i h dem c a ic g e a ce a d he c e di g li e a e  i cli a i   g  
anti-intellectualism with anti-elitism (Hayward, 2003). Nevertheless, like Wilders, 
Baudet separates himself from the political elite, by regularly berating figures or 
institutions that are connected to the incumbent government. In order to cast this group 
in a negative light, he uses several referential strategies to identify its members. 
According  Ba de , he D ch li ical eli e  c i  f a clique of stuck-up 
e ke ,  e - eeki g e a  a d b ea c a h  ha e  ead a b k i  
hei  li e .  He he  ig al  hi  allegia ce  he di g led e  f he fa  igh  h  
have hi icall  c dem ed ch eli i  b  e ea i g he h a e, We a e bei g 
de mi ed.  He e Ba de  i  i g a e ec i i a i  a eg  a  he i  a em i g  
position himself as a victim of the oppressive policies of an elite class. Yet, unlike many 
right-wing populist politicians, including Wilders, Baudet does not attempt to intensify 
this victimhood argument with an associated frame of anti-intellectualism. It can be 
argued that Wilders even deliberately positions himself as intellectually inferior to the 
political mainstream in some of his discourse to dichotomise Dutch society into average 
citizens and an elite class. This is exemplified in his tweet in February 2017 in response 
to an accusation that he had made a contradictory promise, “Hey left-wing elitist losers 
enjoy my slip of the tongue, but we are going to de-islamitise the Netherlands very 
soon and that is not a slip of the tongue  (Wilders, 2017a). 
O  he c a , Ba de  li k  he eli e i h idi  a d  as mentioned previously  
characterises himself and his followers as academic and artistically inclined.  
Because Baudet goes in to far more detail in identifying the traits and characteristics of 
the national in-group than Wilders, he does not need to characterise out-groups with 
the same level of precision as the latter. As mentioned earlier, Baudet never uses the 
d M lim   I lam  i  hi  add e . Ra he  he invites his audience to imagine 
Muslims by framing the in-group so clearly as Aryans and evoking Islamophobic 
sentiments through carefully constructed intensification strategies. In the latter case, he 
commences by seamlessly connecting the alleged economic problems of immigration to 
hei  c l al c e e ce  b  cha i i g Ec mic b d  P ime Mi i e  R e f  
all i g hundreds of thousands of people from totally different cultures to enter the 
Ne he la d .  Hi  b le me i  f he g e me  ejec i  f he F D  al  
help return unthreatened Syrians back to their country in the same sentence could be 
interpreted as a referential strategy whereby Syrian refugees (invariably Muslim) 
e i mi e he e all  diffe e  c l e .  He f ll  hi  i ade i h a  ambig  
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assessment of the terrorist attack that took place in Utrecht two days prior to the 
election. “An absolute crisis is looming for the police, in which our safety on the street, 
which can hardly be further secured, will be placed under even more pressure.   
Because the vast majority of his audience was aware that the attack was carried out by a 
Muslim, Baudet is creating a link between the previous cultural incompatibility 
argument, Syrian refugees and terrorism. This encourages his audience to view all 
Muslims as cultural aliens who often become terrorists. This predication strategy is 
e e ded i  he f ll i g e e ce he  Ba de  c llec i i e  a i , a med bbe  
and life-threatening e le  a d c ec  hem  he hidde  c l al da ge  ha  
manifested i  he di g ace  ha  a  he a ack. While ch fea -mongering rhetoric 
can be perceived as a Legitimization through a hypothetical future strategy that 
Wilders regularly employs, again, it is important to recognise that Baudet does not 
directly demoni e he e em  a d i  d i g , a g abl  hi k  he c e ial 
I lam h bic  image.   
Conclusion 
Thi  a e  ha  a em ed  de a d he ea  f  Thie  Ba de  F D i  e  
Gee  Wilde  PVV a  he m  la  fa  igh -wing political party at the 2019 Dutch 
e a e elec i . I  a  belie ed ha  a c m a a i e DHA f Ba de  ic  eech i h 
a elec ed c  f Wilde  di c i e e  ld be e f he m  effec i e mea  
to acquire such knowledge given that discourse underpins social movements, as it is 
b h ciall  c i ed a d ciall  c i i e  (Rei igl & W dak, 2009: 89). Thi  
a i ale a  c m ehe i el  di c ed i  de   j if  he d  me h d l g  f  
what was a complex research question given its context and general composition. The 
DHA methodology systematised the process of analysing the selected discursive texts, 
which ultimately made the relationship between content, context and political strategy 
a lot clearer. Although the study was not able to provide a definite answer to the question 
as to why Baudet appears to have taken over from Wilders as the most popular far- right 
politician in the Netherlands, it did make some important discoveries.    
The DHA generated three interesting insights with regards  Thie  Ba de  
discursive strategy. Firstly, he appears to have the same fondness for intensification 
strategies as Wilders, emphatically denouncing the vision and behaviour of the 
incumbent government and the perceived or implied cultural enemy at regular intervals. 
This is very much related to the second discovery, which is that Baudet, like Wilders, 
attempts to create a sense of social crisis and mobilise the public around the pursuit of 
a return to a glorified past. Within this frame Baudet uses a straightforward predication 
a eg  ha  i  f e  ee  i  Wilde  di c e i  hich -groups are portrayed as the 
people responsible for the demise of Dutch society. However, it is the extent to which 
the in-group and out-group is identified where Baudet distinguishes himself from 
Wilders. The final and most significant discovery of the DHA was that Baudet never 
explicitly identifies who the out-g   c l al e em  i , hich de ia e  
c ide abl  f m Wilde  a eg  f c i e l  dem i i g Islam. Instead, Baudet 
allows the audience to easily infer that Muslim people are the most threatening out-
group in Dutch society by employing an identity constructive strategy and clearly 
defining the Dutch in-group. Through this strategy he creates another point of difference 
f m Wilde  b  em ha i i g hi  a  affi i  i h i ellec  a d a i ic c ea i  
rather than sticking with the conventional far right-wing image of simplicity and a 





creates a rational and less xenophobic guise for the FvD without compromising the key 
preferences of far right-wing voters, which could have been a critical determinant of its 
success and the concomitant decline of the PVV at the 2019 Dutch senate elections. To 
generate more conclusive findings on this topic, one might consider a DHA of some of 
Ba de  he  add e e   al e a i el  c d c  a a i a i e a al i   e  
preferences from the elections. 
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